Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was as much a loser as he was a winner because his Thai Rak Thai did not win in the south. It was a sounding rejection of his heavy-handed approach to settling the conflict in the trouble-plagued region. Southern voters also showed their preference for the values of democracy by turning out in strong numbers to vote amid tight security.

Soon the rest of the country will find out whether the assertiveness and self-confidence of the southerners will become a liability.

Before the vote, expectations were high that TRT would sweep 10 out of the 11 seats at stake in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. In the 2001 election, TRT got six while the rest went to the Democrat Party. However, as things turned out this time, none of the TRT’s candidates was elected, not even four former Democrat MPs who defected to the ruling party last year. Overall, the Democrats captured 10 seats and Chat Thai one. Voter turnout was more than 70 per cent.

The remaining 11 southern provinces expressed a similar sentiment to the one presented by the voters in the deep South. Out of the 54 seats available in the South, the Democrats took 52 while Chat Thai and TRT each got one.

Just a few days after he assumed premiership in 2001, Thaksin said he wanted to win the South. The assessment at that time was that in order to form a one-party government in the future, a huge win there was a prerequisite. Since then, no effort has been spared to try to win the southerners’ support.

In the past year the South has grappled with a major upsurge in armed violence that has led to the deaths of over 600 government officials and civilians. The government’s alacrity to use force, while a necessary part of providing security and stability, has yielded countless violations of human rights, including abductions and killings.

The southern voters have spoken out loud rebuffing these harsh measures outright and currently looking for alternative approaches, whatever they may be. Before Thaksin’s ascension, concerned groups and stakeholders of all types were able to speak together and air their grievances, allowing them to settle their differences on their own terms. Incidents of violence were infrequent and manageable. Coexistence was possible.

At this juncture, the Democrat Party, which holds the South’s parliamentary seats, and the government, which holds the power, have to get together to collaborate on policy. If they do not, the situation in the South will spiral out of control and end up in the kind of political and religious conflict from which nobody in the country will benefit.

If Thaksin is really the visionary that he claims to be, he can easily use his electoral victory as a lens through which to review and improve his policies. He can also initiate the policy debate to a broader-based selection of views, including those of the critical opposition and religious and civil leaders. The strong show of solidarity in the three southernmost provinces means that participatory policy-making and transparency are crucial to creating workable solutions that are acceptable to the local people.

Can Thaksin overcome this Catch-22 situation?

At first Thaksin was ambivalent, treating the poll numbers from the South as if they were a knee-jerk reaction by reiterating that the government would not change its policy in the restive border provinces just because TRT did not have an MP there. Policies involving billions of baht in assistance and development money, he added, would continue unabated.

Over the weekend, however, he became more flexible, saying that the government stood ready to welcome new ideas and proposals from others, even the opposition party, as well as local views and concerns.

If this is to be the approach of the Thaksin II government, the Pattani Declaration, drafted by the Democrat Party last December, could prove useful. The declaration calls for a return to the status quo before Thaksin came to power. This covers the revival of the Southern Provinces Administrative Centre and the abolition of the CEO governor system in the South. Other recommendations touch on the improvement of education for Thai Muslims and the establishment of sharia courts to handle family and inheritance matters.

From the government’s standpoint, some of these elements are hard to swallow, especially the Islamic courts. It is also impossible for Thaksin to ditch the CEO system down south - his own brianchild.

Like it or not, in the next four years the southern crisis will be Thaksin’s Achilles’ heel, occupying the top of the government’s agenda. Unfortunately, time is not on his side as the violence has already intensified in the week since the election. He has to move fast and in a non-partisan way to come up with a well-thought-out strategy.

In more ways than one, the opposition’s blueprint could be the life-saver Thaksin is looking for. But does he have the humility to accept the opposition’s advice? What changes could be made to polices which have already in place? How does the Southern Border Provinces Peace-building Command fit in the new setting?

The best way to get past this problem would be to hold a special parliamentary session to discuss the South when the House begins deliberations next month following the naming of the Cabinet. That way every view and concern can be discussed and a consensus reached. If he accepts this outcome, it will be a win-win situation.

Thaksin has to start improving his position outside Thailand. He has alienated the country’s neighbours, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. With all the Muslim problems at home, the country needs all the help it can get from its friends, especially from the members of Asean. Ways must be found to restore trust and confidence with these two dynamic Islamic countries before the ill-feelings have a chance to harden.